Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief

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Oxford University Press, 2000 - Philosophy - 261 pages
In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction.
 

Contents

INTRODUCTION
1
1 HUMES ARGUMENT
6
2 RELIABILISM
22
3 REALISM AND THE NOMIRACLES ARGUMENT
35
4 PROBABILISM
61
5 DEDUCTIVISM
94
6 THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY
109
7 A NEW SPECIES OF LOGIC
121
8 THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
168
9 CHANCE AND PROBABILITY
221
FINALE
239
OF MIRACLES
241
References
247
Index
257
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About the author (2000)

Colin Howson is Professor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics.

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